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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43757 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-9625 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MICHAEL DUANE AGE,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Michael Age appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed and executed his sentence, particularly because it made the entire five-year 
term fixed based on the assertion:  “we don’t have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on 
parole.  But that’s the best I can do.”  (Tr., p.49, Ls.4-12.)  Mr. Age asserts there are 
three problems with that conclusion.  First, it misconstrues the scope of the district 
court’s discretion.  Second, it is clearly erroneous, as it is disproved by the record and 
the district court’s own actions at the sentencing hearing.  Third, the district court 
improperly based its decision primarily on disputed reports from Mr. Age’s criminal 
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history that are at least eight years old without giving sufficient consideration to 
Mr. Age’s current actions and character.   
For any and all of those reasons, this Court should reduce Mr. Age’s sentence as 
it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Age does not have any alcohol or substance abuse issues.  (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.15, 159.)  And, while he does not have any 
specific mental health disorders, he receives social security disability based on a 
diagnosed mild intellectual disability.1  (PSI, pp.9, 168-69.)  As a result of that diagnosis, 
Mr. Age participated in an individual education program.  (PSI, p.8.)  While he 
graduated with the aid of that program, he remained illiterate.  (PSI, pp.8-9; Tr., p.11, 
Ls.16-17.)  He also has issues with anger management and appropriate responses to 
stressors.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.7 (PSI author recounting statements by Mr. Age’s sister, 
who talked about Mr. Age’s need for anger management treatment).)   
Those issues came to a head when Mr. Age got into an argument with a 
neighbor.  While he was removing a tree branch with a chainsaw, the neighbor 
confronted Mr. Age because he had parked his trailer against her garbage can.  
(PSI, p.4.)  According to Mr. Age, he had parked there because of the branch he was 
removing.  (PSI, p.5.)  According to the PSI author, as the argument escalated, “neither 
                                            
1 The documentation of Mr. Age’s diagnosis, dating back to his elementary school days, 
uses the term “mild mental retardation.”  (See, e.g., PSI, p.105.)  However, as the Court 
of Appeals has pointed out, the Legislature has since adopted a provision which favors 
using the term “intellectual disability” rather the term “mental retardation” in 
such circumstances.  State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 309 n.1 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
I.C. § 73–114A).  
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party took the initiative to disengage and/or fully retreat to their residence and contact 
police.”  (PSI, p.14.)  The neighbor was belittling Mr. Age during the argument.  
(See, e.g., PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Age dropped the chainsaw and picked up a baseball bat in 
response.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-3; PSI, p.4.)  The neighbor was “making the gesture of ‘bring 
it on, come on, bring it on.’”  (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-15; PSI, p.4; see also Tr., p.38, Ls.8-9 
(defense counsel acknowledging the neighbor’s behavior, while explaining Mr. Age’s 
actions, did not excuse them).)  The State ultimately charged Mr. Age with two counts of 
aggravated assault for allegedly threatening the neighbor with the chainsaw and the 
baseball bat, and also charged an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon.  
(R., pp.42-43.)   
While defense counsel represented there was a potential trial defense based on 
the neighbor’s behavior, Mr. Age decided he wanted to take responsibility for his 
actions.  (Tr., p.37, Ls.17-23.)  As a result, he pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
battery for the baseball bat and the State agreed to dismiss the other count and the 
weapon enhancement.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.15-18.)  The State also agreed to recommend the 
district court impose a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and to 
recommend it suspend that sentence for a period of probation.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-25.)  The 
prosecutor explained that agreement was the product of Mr. Age’s situation – while the 
prosecutor felt a rider program would be best for Mr. Age, his illiteracy would prevent 
him from completing such a program.  (Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2.)  As such, the 
prosecutor recommended probation with the understanding that Mr. Age would work on 
becoming literate and otherwise rehabilitating during the period of probation.  
(See Tr., p.35, Ls.2-10.)   
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In that regard, Mr. Age reported that he had been working with a tutor while in jail 
to learn to read and write, and he also had materials about programs available out of 
custody to continue those efforts.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21; Tr., p.39, Ls.14-16.)  He also 
expressed a desire to begin anger management programs.  (Tr., p.42, Ls.12-15; see 
also PSI, pp.168-69 (the mental health evaluation recommending the same).)  As such, 
defense counsel also recommended probation.  (Tr., p.46, Ls.16-21.) 
The PSI author also concluded that Mr. Age would be a “good candidate for 
probation.”  (PSI, p.15.)  Specifically, she highlighted the fact that he has strong familial 
support, the fact that this was his first felony conviction, and the fact that there were no 
records of any probation violations from Mr. Age’s previous periods of misdemeanor 
probation as indicative of his ability to succeed on supervised release.  (PSI, pp.14-15.)  
The PSI author also noted that Mr. Age’s LSI-R score was 14, which placed him in the 
“low” category for risk to reoffend.  (PSI, p.12.)   
The district court, however, rejected the recommendations for probation.  Its 
comments while imposing sentence focused primarily on Mr. Age’s criminal history and 
the police reports from two prior cases originally charged as felonies, but subsequently 
reduced to misdemeanors, particularly one addressing an allegation of rape.  (Tr., p.45, 
L.4 - p.47, L.12.)  However, in the PSI, Mr. Age explained the rape charge arose when 
he kicked his girlfriend out of his house after learning she was using drugs.  (PSI, p.5.)  
According to Mr. Age, she physically assaulted him, left, and reported that he had raped 
her.  (PSI, p.5.)   
Based on its comments about the “violent” offenses in Mr. Age’s criminal record, 
and apparently misunderstanding the terms of the plea agreement regarding the 
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weapon enhancement, the district court originally pronounced a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with five years fixed.  (Tr., p.47, Ls.13-21.)  When both attorneys pointed 
out that the weapons enhancement had been dismissed as part of the plea agreement, 
the district court reevaluated and imposed a five-year sentence.  (Tr., p.48, L.7 - p.49, 
L.7.)  However, it explained there would be no indeterminate term because “[w]e don’t 
have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on parole.  But that’s the best I can do.”  (Tr., p.49, 




Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed Mr. Age’s 
sentence, especially by making the entire sentence fixed time. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Age’s 
Sentence, Especially By Making The Entire Sentence Fixed Time 
 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982).  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Age does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
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discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.   
The district court’s sentencing decision in this case is an abuse of discretion for 
three reasons:  (1) it was based on a misunderstanding of the scope of its discretion; 
(2) the finding upon which that decision was based is clearly erroneous; and (3) it failed 
to sufficiently consider the mitigating factors, focusing instead on facts from cases 
resolved at least eight years previously. 
First, the district court’s statement – that the fixed term of five years was “the best 
I can do” (Tr., p.49, Ls.11-12) – indicates the district court did not feel it could impose an 
indeterminate term in Mr. Age’s case.  That does not properly understand the scope of 
the district court’s discretion.  See State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining that the first of the inquiries for an exercise of discretion “is satisfied only if 
the trial court correctly perceived the full scope of its discretion”).  It was certainly within 
the outer limits of the district court’s discretion to impose the five-year fixed term.2  
See, e.g., State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 567 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in imposing a sentence of fifteen years fixed for voluntary manslaughter, 
based in part on a consideration of the defendant’s past violent behavior), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 375 (2005).  However, it was also 
within the outer limits of the district court’s discretion to impose a sentence with an 
indeterminate period and allow the parole board to determine whether it could, in fact, 
supervise Mr. Age on release.  See, e.g., State v. Knight, 114 Idaho 923, 924-25 
                                            
2 While the five-year fixed sentence may have been within the outer limits of the district 
court’s discretion, as discussed infra, it was not a proper exercise of discretion in this 
case. 
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(Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the nature of Idaho’s sentencing scheme under the Unified 
Sentencing Act).  Therefore, the sentence with no indeterminate time because the 
department did not have the ability to supervise Mr. Age was not “the best I can do.”  
Since the district court’s statements reflects a misunderstanding of the scope of its 
discretion, its resulting decision did not constitute a valid exercise of its discretion.  
See Anderson, 152 Idaho at 22. 
Second, the district court’s reason for making the entire term fixed – “We don’t 
have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on parole” (Tr., p.49, Ls.10-11) – is clearly 
erroneous as it is disproved by the record and the district court’s own actions at the 
sentencing hearing.  State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007) (reiterating that a 
finding is clearly erroneous when it is “unsupported by substantial and competent 
evidence”).  At the sentencing hearing, the district court was initially operating under a 
misunderstanding of the terms of the plea agreement, and so pronounced a sentence 
as though the weapons enhancement, which had been dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement, was still in play.  (See Tr., p.47, L.13 - p.49, L.5.)  To that end, the district 
court articulated a sentence for a term of five years fixed, “followed by 15 years 
indeterminate.”  (Tr., p.47, Ls.17-20.)  As such, the district court obviously believed that 
the system does have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on parole.  And yet, when its 
mistake was pointed out, and the district court reformulated the sentence to comply with 
the plea agreement, only then did it decide the system was not able to supervise 
Mr. Age on parole.  (Tr., p.49, Ls.4-12.)  Thus, the district court’s actions belie its 
justification for the sentence it ultimately imposed. 
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The record also reveals the district court’s justification to be clearly erroneous.  
Specifically, the record shows Mr. Age has served periods of misdemeanor probation in 
the past.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.10.)  And, as the PSI author’s comments show, there is no 
evidence contradicting Mr. Age’s statement that he successfully completed that 
probation without any reported violations.  (See PSI, pp.6, 15.)  Thus, the record shows 
the system does have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on release from custody.  Not 
only that, the record shows such supervised release is likely to be successful, as 
Mr. Age was determined to be a “low” risk for recidivism.  (PSI, p.12 (reporting Mr. Age’s 
LSI-R score as 14).)  As such, based on all the facts in the record, the PSI author 
explained, “Mr. Age appears to be a good candidate” for supervised release on the 
proper terms and conditions.  (PSI, p.15 (emphasis added).)  Since the district court’s 
justification – that “we don’t have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on parole” – is clearly 
erroneous, its sentencing decision based on that conclusion is a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
Third, the district court improperly focused on facts from a previous, unrelated 
case, rather than sufficiently considering Mr. Age’s current actions and character.  
See State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999) (vacating a sentence 
because the district court had improperly focused on an offense for which the defendant 
had already been sentenced when it was imposing sentence in a different, though 
related, case).  Based on a consideration of Mr. Age’s current actions and character, the 
prosecutor, the PSI author, and defense counsel all recommended that the district court 
suspend Mr. Age’s sentence for a period of probation.  (Tr., p.34, L.11 - p.35, L.10; 
Tr., p.41, Ls.16-21; PSI, p.15.)  For example, Mr. Age demonstrated amenability to that 
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sort of rehabilitation-focused sentence as he had been working with a tutor to learn to 
read while in jail, and had received information about programs available out of custody 
to continue those efforts.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21.)  He also expressed amenability to anger 
management treatment that was available on probation.  (Tr., p.42, Ls.12-15; see also 
PSI, pp.168-69 (the mental health evaluation recommending that sort of programming 
for Mr. Age).)  Therefore, a period of probation to promote those rehabilitative efforts 
would best serve the goals of sentencing. 
It is not as if Mr. Age had other issues that might cause problems during a period 
of probation.  He was evaluated as a low risk to reoffend on probation.  (PSI, p.12.)  
Additionally, the GAIN-I concluded that Mr. Age did not have any alcohol or substance 
abuse concerns.  (PSI, pp.15, 167.)    With the support of his family, Mr. Age developed 
a living arrangement which would address the particular facts of this case:  he would 
live with his sister and told his parents, if they wanted to see him, they would have to 
visit him at his sister’s home.  (Tr., p.43, Ls.14-21.)  That way, he would not be in 
situation to potentially violate the no-contact order between him and his parent’s 
neighbor, the victim.   
Despite all this information about Mr. Age’s current character, the district court’s 
comments at sentencing focused primarily on disputed facts from incidents that 
resolved over eight years prior.  (Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.47, L.12 (discussing Mr. Age’s prior 
record); see also Tr., p.44, L.1 - p.47, L.12 (the district court’s entire comments prior to 
the imposition of sentence).)  For example, the district court relied on the facts in the 
police reports in the case originally charged as rape, but which was ultimately reduced 
to misdemeanor domestic battery, to conclude Mr. Age was a risk to society.  
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(Tr., p.46, Ls.6-21.)  However, as Mr. Age explained in the PSI interview, those reports 
were disputed. (See PSI, p.5.)  More important, though, to determining a proper 
sentence in this case, the PSI information reveals that Mr. Age did not have any further 
charges after that case resolved until the instant offense.  (PSI, pp.4-5, 10.)  
Furthermore, the instant offense constituted his first felony conviction.  (PSI, p.14.)  
Thus, the record shows that the risk he may or may have posed based on the prior 
offense has been reduced in the intervening years.  (See PSI, p.112) (concluding Mr. 
Age currently presents a “low” risk to society).) 
As such, Mr. Age’s criminal history, while it does contain some “violent” offenses, 
does not justify a five-year, all-fixed, sentence in this case, particularly in light of all the 
other mitigating information which has developed in the intervening years.  That 
sentence, like the one vacated in Findeisen, essentially and impermissibly seeks to 
resentence Mr. Age for an offense which has already been addressed.  See Findeisen, 
133 Idaho at 230.  Rather, in such cases, “while the district court may properly take into 
consideration [the defendant’s] other criminal conduct, . . . sentence must be rendered 
with the recognition that [the defendant] has already been sentenced for those related 
offenses, and the court’s focus at resentencing must be on determination of the 
appropriate sentence for the [offense] that is before the court.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Since the district court’s focus at the sentencing hearing in this case was not on the 
offense before it, but on the prior, unrelated convictions in Mr. Age’s record, the 
sentence in this case, like the sentence in Findeisen, constituted an abuse of the district 
court’s discretion. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, the district court abused its discretion when it 




Mr. Age respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 26th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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